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DISCLOSURE, SCHOLARLY ETHICS, AND THE FUTURE
OF LAW REVIEWS: A FEW PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
Ronald K.L. Collins* & Lisa G. Lerman**
The reader should know through what
spectacles his adviser is viewing the problem.
-William 0. Douglas
Washington Law Review (1965)
Scholarship is the work-product of scholars. The word derives from
the Latin schola, as in school. Hence, scholarship is related to education,
which in turn is related to the advancement of human knowledge. By
that measure, the best scholarship may increase our knowledge, both
practical and theoretical. But when undisclosed bias affects that which is
offered up as knowledge, it may unduly slant our understanding of life,
law, and other things that matter. While bias-free knowledge may be a
utopian ideal, it is, nonetheless, a principle worthy of our respect.
Case in point: According to the Washington Post,2 the National Rifle
Association has funded some of the scholarship propounding the view
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own a gun.
Before this sponsored scholarship, such an interpretation of the
Amendment was regarded as tenuous.3 Over three decades and a number
Harold S. Shefelman Scholar, University of Washington, School of Law. By way of full
disclosure, in the early 1990s I worked for the Center for Science in the Public Interest and was
assigned to the Integrity in Science Project. My work included projects related to securing greater
disclosure in professional journals.
Professor and Coordinator of Clinical Programs, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. I have written on a number of topics related to professional dishonesty, including
First Do No Harm: Laiw Professor Misconduct Toiard Law Students, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86
(2006), and Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 S.
TEX. L. REV. 467 (2001), both of which deal with the ethical obligations of legal scholars. The
authors thank Professor Deborah Rhode, whose work on this issue is acknowledged below, for her
thoughtful comments on this Essay.
1. William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1965)
(address prepared for the annual Washington Law Review banquet, April 21, 1965).
2. Peter Finn, How the NRA Helped Reshape Views ofthe Second Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar.
14, 2013, at Al.
3. Id. Nelson Lund, the Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second
Amendment at George Mason University (a chair endowed by the National Rifle Association), said
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of books and articles later, the United States Supreme Court, in 2008,
recognized for the first time an individual, though limited, constitutional
right to possess a gun.4 The change has altered the political and
regulatory framework and constrains attempts to stem the tide of gun
violence in the United States. Whatever one makes of this, there is
reason to believe that the success of a legal scholarship campaign funded
by the NRA and the gun industry might well have affected the direction
of the law.
It is not easy to decipher which articles on the Second Amendment
were paid for by the gun lobby because very few of these articles include
information about financial support, if any, for the work.5 This is
unsurprising because the vast majority of law reviews do not require
disclosure of financial support or affiliations that might compromise the
6intellectual independence of their authors.
One scholar reports that in 2008 only 5.5% of law review articles
included acknowledgement of financial support for research. Perhaps
the idea that the Constitution protects an individual right to own a gun was previously regarded as
"preposterous and just propaganda from gun nuts." Id
4. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-96 (2008).
5. Don Kates was identified in the Washington Post article, supra note 2, as one of the most
prominent and prolific authors espousing the "NRA view" of the Second Amendment.
Occasionally, he mentions in a biographical footnote at the beginning of each of his articles that he
is "affiliated with the Pacific Research Institute," a conservative think tank. A review of fourteen of
Kates' articles in journals published by law reviews at Hastings, Emory, Hamline, UCLA, Cardozo,
William & Mary, Tennessee, Washington University, Michigan, Colorado, Fordham, Harvard,
Northwestern, the University of San Francisco, Chicago, and Duke, turned up only one article (in
the Washington Laii Quarterly) in which he and his co-author acknowledged funding from the
Julius Rosenthal Fund and the Kirkland & Ellis Research Fund of Northwestern University. (Kates'
co-author on this article was on the faculty at Northwestern.) See Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates,
Jr., OfHolocausts and Gun Control, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1237, 1237 n.al (1997). In the other articles,
Kates thanks individuals who perhaps contributed ideas, but says nothing about what financial
support, if any, he might have received.
6. Professor Deborah Rhode notes that "[i]n fields other than medicine and science, many
journals and professional societies lack disclosure requirements entirely, or do not mandate
sufficiently specific information to gauge the likelihood of a bias." Deborah L. Rhode, The
Professional Ethics of Law Professors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70, 75 (2006). Other scholars also have
criticized the legal academy for its failure to impose any standards of transparency, not to mention
reliability and validity. See generally Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic Integriry and
Legal Scholarship in the Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 33
(2010); Rory K. Little, Law Professors as Lawyers: Consultants, Of Counsel, and the Ethics of Self-
Flagellation, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 345 (2001); Thomas 0. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and the
Integrity of Sponsored Law and Economics Research, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 51 (2010).
7. Shireen A. Barday, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2008). Larissa MacFarquhar reports in The New Yorker that Aaron Swartz,
the brilliant computer genius who recently committed suicide, did the research that produced the
data above. Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem for a Dream, NEW YORKER, Mar. 11, 2013, at 48, 51.
Swartz is said to have "downloaded a significant portion of the articles on the Westlaw legal-
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half of these acknowledged donors are universities, which routinely
support research and usually have no impact on the content.8 Thus,
almost ninety-five percent of law review articles included no
information about whether the researcher received financial support for
the work. Because virtually all law reviews have no disclosure policy,
these authors are free to reveal or conceal the sources of their funding
and their affiliations.9
In varying ways, legislators, regulators, and judges rely upon legal
scholarship in developing law and policy and in writing, amending and
interpreting legal rules. Scholars have time to delve deeply into the
topics on which they write. At its best, their work is respected because of
the depth of inquiry involved and because of their expertise. It is
important, then, for legal scholars to exercise independent judgment and
likewise to be open and candid with their audiences as to how they
reached their conclusions.
I. IMPARTIALITY AS A PROFESSIONAL NORM
American judges must recuse themselves from deciding matters if
their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . ."'o Such
impartiality is defined as the "absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or
against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of
an open mind in considering issues . .. .1 What is important is not only
actual judicial integrity, but the appearance of integrity as well. It also is
important for anyone involved in the judicial system to have full
knowledge of those who judge them, including possible sources of bias.
Like judges, all lawyers are expected to uphold the administration of
justice, and accordingly, to avoid conduct that exhibits bias.
Commentary in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explains it this
way: "A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly
manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, violates [the Model Rules] when such actions are
research database in order to analyze their sources of funding, in the hope of determining whether
economic interests affected their conclusions. He gave the data to a Stanford law student, and she
published an article in the Stanford Law Reviewt based on his findings." Id.
8. Barday, supra note 7, at 713.
9. See id. at 713.
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2011).
11. Id. at Terminology.
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prejudicial to the administration of justice." 2 While this passage
formally applies only to the conduct of lawyers representing clients, the
basic principle underlying the rule certainly is relevant to legal scholars.
To be sure, we do not regulate legal scholars in the same way that we
regulate judges and lawyers. Nevertheless, we expect scholars to
embody high standards of integrity in the work that they do. While
scholars do not decide cases, they publish articles that may influence the
outcomes of cases and impact the development of the law. The
legitimacy of legal scholarship depends on the integrity of the scholar's
work. Both the careful process that law schools undertake in reviewing
the written work of a prospective faculty member, and the review
process law journals engage in before they make an offer to publish,
provide some safeguards of the disinterestedness and the integrity of the
scholar's work product. Even so, given current standards (or the lack of
them), much legal scholarship is published without editorial knowledge
or disclosure of the authors' backgrounds and affiliations.
II. TRANSPARENCY IN DISCLOSURE POLICIES
How much we value what is offered to us as fact depends on how
information is presented and who presents it. This much is obvious from
the way we speak, as in, "You cannot believe anything on Fox News," or
"Did you expect the New York Times to be objective?" So, too, some
express skepticism when, for example, they hear of an environmental
assessment prepared by either the Sierra Club or underwritten by Exxon-
Mobil. To much the same effect, consider how we might judge a report
on the causes of violence in America if the study were, on the one hand,
conducted by the National Rifle Association, or, on the other hand,
underwritten by the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence. Or how might we
view the objectivity of a judge presiding over a case in which she or her
spouse had a financial interest? In all of these instances and others, we
would have suspicions. This is not to say that a bias-free result is
impossible in every such instance. But it is to say that we do want to
know of that potential for bias and we do want to know the facts or
affiliations that may jeopardize what is offered to us as fact. In other
words, disclosure is important; transparency matters; and the more we
know about the speaker's perspective and potential biases, the more
likely we are to make truly informed, or at least better informed,
decisions about the respective worth of what is published. The disclosure
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2002).
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2013] DISCLOSURE, SCHOLARLY ETHICS, AND LAW REVIEWS
ideal, as noted below, is one valued in science and other professional
journals.
As of four years ago, nearly ninety percent of 256 medical journals
had formal conflict of interest policies, which mandate various kinds of
disclosures.13 Many scientific journals have also adopted such policies,
though less consistently than medical journals.14 Such journals are not
alone in their insistence on integrity and disclosure in scholarship. The
American Historical Association has likewise expressed concerns in this
area and requires disclosure. The Association's Statement on Standards
of Professional Conduct declares that "[h]istorians should acknowledge
the receipt of any financial support, sponsorship, or unique privileges
(including special access to research material) related to their research,
especially when such privileges could bias their research findings.""
The American Political Science Association also expressed similar
concerns in its Guide to Professional Ethics:
With respect to any public scholarly activity including
publication of the results of research, the individual
researcher: ... bears sole responsibility for
publication; . . . should disclose all relevant sources of financial
support; ... should indicate any condition imposed by financial
sponsors or others on research publication, or other scholarly
activities; and . .. should conscientiously acknowledge any
assistance received in conducting research.
Though these disclosure polices are clearly the norm for such
journals, they are largely unheard of among legal journals. What is
stressed in the former is strikingly absent in the latter. While a debate
rages on among science journals about the need for even stricter policies
requiring disclosure of funding sources and enforcement practices,
13. See Jared A. Blum, Kalev Freeman, Richard C. Dart, & Richelle J. Cooper, Requirements and
Definitions in Conflict of Interest Policies of Medical Journals, 302 JAMA 2230, 2230 (2009)
("Most journals that officially endorsed International Committee of Medical Journal Editors
guidelines had [conflict of interest] policies . . . .").
14. See generally Jessica S. Ancker & Annette Flanagin, A Comparison of Conflict of Interest
Policies at Peer-Revieiwed Journals in Different Scientific Disciplines, 13 ScI. ENG. ETHICS
147 (2007).
15. Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct, AM. HISTORICAL Ass'N (June 8, 2011),
http://historians.org/pubs/Free/ProfessionalStandards.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
16. AM. POLITICAL SCI. Ass'N, A GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 9 (2d
ed. 2008), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/ethicsguideweb.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Editorial, Add a Healthy Dose of Skepticism, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2012, at E3
("Health-care research is rife with potential conflicts of interest. Pharmaceutical firms have
provided almost 60 percent of all biomedical research funding in the United States, raising questions
about the integrity of some drug studies. In January 2007, the online journal PLOS published an
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there is a disconcerting silence in the world of law reviews. Law reviews
almost uniformly do not ask authors and contributors if their work is
funded by outside sources that would have a stake in the findings or
conclusions of their work. Similarly, law reviews do not ask authors
and/or contributors if their current or past affiliations are with groups
that have a significant stake in their work. Silence is the norm; ignorance
is the governing rule. Consider the following five hypothetical
' 9
scenarios:
* A "scholar" writes a law review article on contractual
breaches and remedies in connection with digital content
contracts but fails to disclose that within the past year a
software company hired him to work on precisely such issues
in order to diminish corporate liability.
* A "scholar" writes on tort reform without disclosing that she
was of counsel to the Institute for Legal Reform, which the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce funds.20
* A public interest lawyer authors a long article on the First
Amendment rights of tobacco companies to advertise their
products without disclosing that her organization had
21
received funding from tobacco companies.
* A "scholar" writes a review of a new book about the Second
Amendment without disclosing that she helped organize an
amicus brief in favor of strict gun control laws.
* A "scholar" writes a critique of the Securities Exchange
Commission's antitrust policies without disclosing that he
analysis of nutrition studies involving soft drinks, juice or milk; it found that more than half had
industry funding. More important, the studies' conclusions directly correlated with who funded
them.").
18. See Merrill Goozner, Unrevealed: Non-Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest in Four Leading
Medical and Scientific Journals, INTEGRITY IN SCIENCE (July 12, 2004), available at
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/unrevealedfinal.pdf
19. See generally Ronald K.L. Collins, A Letter on Scholarly Ethics, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139
(1995) (discussing various conflicts of interest and calling on law reviews to establish disclosure
policies).
20. See Joanne Doroshow, The Secret Chamber of Commerce and its "Tort Reform" Mission,
HUFFTNGTON POST, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joanne-doroshow/the-secret-
chamber-of-com b337634.html ("In 1998, the U.S. Chamber [of Commerce] created the ILR to
pursue the Chamber's so-called 'tort reform' agenda: protecting corporations from liability,
weakening the civil jury system and blocking the courthouse door for sick and injured
Americans.").
21. See generally Philip J. Hilts, Nader Assails A.C.L. U. on Tobacco Industry Gifts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1993, at A12 (stating that "starting in 1987 the A.C.L.U. had accepted large sums of money
from tobacco companies, including $500,000 from the Philip Morris Companies Inc." and such
sums were not publicly disclosed).
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worked on such issues for a corporate law firm the year
before he became a law professor.
Such scenarios are neither novel nor new. As far back as fifty-seven
years ago, Congressman Wright Patman (D-TX) issued a report
complaining of the failure to disclose conflicts of interest in law review
articles.22 The report documented multiple instances in which professors
were paid by interested entities financed by "the defenders of price
discrimination, basing-point pricing practices, and other monopolistic
practices". Of course, one could offer many newer examples to drive
home the same conceptual point. The time is long overdue for us to stop
turning a blind eye to such practices. Law reviews should adopt
meaningful disclosure polices. If for no other reason, this should be done
to help curb the perception of bias and help enhance the ideal of
transparency by providing more needed information to readers.
True scholars should aspire to intellectual independence, to unbiased
consideration of the topics studied, or at least to disclosure of possible
sources of bias in the scholar's work. In this context, bias refers
to "inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially
in a way considered to be unfair .... 24 Admittedly, bias is a many
colored flag in that it is incredibly difficult to determine as to what
exactly it is or is not. We may never rid ourselves of all our biases (for
better or worse), be they political, religious, cultural, economic, class, or
simply the kind of arbitrary biases so many mortals have. We can,
however, manage biases and attempt to identify them so that readers of
law reviews may better judge the respective merit of the articles they
read.
The goal is not to eliminate any and all potential sources of bias, but
to identify them to readers. Some biases, or at least the potential for
such, are so great that to ignore them and remain silent would be an
22. H.R. REP. No. 84-2966, at 227 (1956) [hereinafter Patman] ("That article adroitly failed to
disclose that the author is affiliated with a law firm presently opposing the Government in a pending
case arising under the Robinson-Patman Act."). See also id. at 34 (regarding a law review author
who failed to report receipt of $13,000 from the Business Advisory Council, an interested party).
For an extended discussion of the Patman report, see Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court and
Legal Writing: Learned Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-Trust Lobby?, 48 GEO. L.J. 105, 112 (1959)
("[T]he authors of many [articles or reports] have been either partisan advocates or unknown; and
that prominent scholars have been hired by antitrust defendants to promote big business views 'in
highly respected publications in the form of law review articles and economic reviews."').
23. Patman, supra note 22, at 31-38.
24. Bias Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/bias
(last visited Mar. 18, 2013); see FED. R. EVID. 702 (regarding the admission of expert scientific
testimony); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the reliability of expert evidence when such experts are paid).
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affront to any scholarly endeavor worthy of the name. Consider what
would happen in the following four hypothetical situations if there were
no disclosure as to the real or likely conflicts of interest:
* A law review hosts a symposium on the costs and benefits of
deregulation in the area of health care-co-sponsored by a
national insurance company.
* A law review holds a conference on regulating environmental
pollution. An international oil company provides honoraria to
some of the participants and generously funds the conference.
* A law review publishes a print symposium on Judicial
Nominations-either the Federalist Society or the American
Constitution Society underwrites the conference and selects
some of the speakers.
* A law review publishes a print symposium on the question of
"fetal personhood"-either Planned Parenthood or Focus on
the Family finances the conference and selects all of the
participants.
How should law review editors screen articles for conflicts of interest
that may taint the work? What disclosures should they require of authors
submitting articles for publication? Which of that information should
they insist be disclosed to readers in articles that they publish? While the
above-mentioned hypotheticals suggest various ethical issues, the most
obvious step is that law reviews should require authors to disclose
funding sources, both at the time that an article is submitted for review
by the journals, and in print if the article is published. Is that really a
debatable point? Would it not seem practically and ethically strange if
such conflicts were not disclosed? We may debate the conflicts'
significance and magnitude, the character and extent of disclosure that
should be required, and what to do about certain conflicts of interest.
However, these hypotheticals tell us that we must require some level of
disclosure. And yet, American law reviews rarely, if ever, require such
disclosure.
It cannot be denied: scholars like the patina of objectivity. Like
Aristotle or Aquinas (or, if you prefer, Herbert Wechsler 2 5), we like to
fancy ourselves as being objective. And if a professor really tries to be
objective when she analyzes an issue in an article,2 6 she might
25. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Lea, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1959) (arguing that because Constitutional adjudication must be different from and free
of "the ad hoc in politics," the Court must adhere to neutral principles in deciding constitutional
questions).
26. See generally Arthur Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18
328 [Vol. 88:321
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understandably hesitate to disclose that two years earlier (before she
became a law professor) she litigated similar issues on behalf of the very
industry that is now the subject of her academic scrutiny. Though the
fact that she once did this work does not alone demonstrate bias or
reveal some deficiency in her analysis, she should disclose the work
because it is relevant to understanding her perspective. Disclosure will
help readers make better-informed judgments. The information obtained
by disclosure is but part of the criteria readers use to evaluate an article.
Such information may alert us to a potential problem, which may or may
not affect how we assess a work.
III. TRANSPARENCY FOR LEGAL SCHOLARS
In an important but often-ignored statement, the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS) has endorsed a "Statement of Good
Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of their Ethical and
Professional Responsibilities." 27 These recommendations urge that
scholars be intellectually honest in their work. They must be free to
criticize the work of others, but must not use false information, distort
facts, or fail to acknowledge evidence relevant to the subjects of their
study. 28 The Statement endorses the kind of disclosure we urge on our
readers in this Essay:
A law professor shall disclose the material facts relating to
receipt of direct or indirect payment for, or any personal
economic interest in, any covered activity that the professor
undertakes in a professorial capacity . . . .Disclosure of material
facts should include: (1) the conditions imposed or expected by
the funding source on views expressed in any future covered
activity and (2) the identity of any funding source, except where
the professor has provided legal representation to a client in a
matter external to legal scholarship under circumstances that
require the identity to remain privileged under applicable law. If
such a privilege prohibits disclosure the professor shall generally
describe the interest represented.29
Virtually all American law reviews, somewhat surprisingly, have not
recognized these standards or adopted their own versions of them. The
CATH. U. L. REv. 290 (1969) (contesting the possibility of truly objective legal scholarship).
27. AALS Handbook: Statements of Good Practices, Ass'N AM. LAW SCH. (May 2003),
http://www.aals.org/about handbooksgp_eth.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
2 8. Id.
29. Id (emphasis added).
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AALS statement also advocates for the following:
A law professor shall also disclose the fact that views or analysis
expressed . . . were espoused or developed in the course of either
paid or unpaid representation of or consultation with a client [if
a reasonable person would think that the professor's position
was affected by the work] . . . . A law professor should
make . . . all disclosures discussed in this policy [early in the
process, including] ... when the professor is invited to produce
the written work for publication or to make a presentation or
when the professor submits the written work for publication or
delivers the presentation.
Notably, the AALS and other similar professional societies expect
and even demand disclosure from their members. By contrast, something
is sorely amiss in the world of legal scholarship if law reviews have no
formal ethical polices governing conflicts and biases.
For all of the above reasons and others, we echo Professor Michael
Closen's long-standing call on law review editors to adopt conflict of
interest and disclosure policies.3 1 "In keeping with [the] notions of the
highest of ethical conduct," he stressed, "the law reviews should insist
that contributors of articles disclose any interest that they may have in
the issues addressed and the positions advocated. Such disclosure[,]" he
added:
[S]hould appear in the first footnote of the article and should
include such matters as the fact that the author is employed by a
party or retained by clients with an interest in the issue, that the
author was paid a fee or compensated somehow for the
preparation of the article, or that the author regularly practices in
the subject area addressed by the article.32
30. Id. Notwithstanding what is set out in the text, it should be noted that the Stanford Law
Review and the Yale Lau Journal, along with the Human Rights Law Review, do have disclosure
policies. See Article Submissions: Ethics Policy, STAN. L. REV.,
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/submissions/print/article (last visited May 20, 2013); YALE LAW
JOURNAL, VOLUME 123 SUBMISSION GUIDELINES § 5: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/123_ylj general submission guidelines%202-
15-13.pdf(last visited May 20, 2013); Human Rights Law Revieiv: Conflict ofInterest Policy, HUM.
RTS. L. REv., http://www.oxfordiournals.org/our journals/hrlr/for authors/conflict.html (last visited
May 20, 2013); see also Journal of Philosophy, Science & Lau: Submission Information for
Authors, J. PHIL. SC. & L., http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/submission.html (last visited May
20, 2013).
31. See Michael L. Closen, A Proposed Code on Professional Responsibility for Law Reviews, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 58 (1988).
32. Id. Consistent with some of this ethical spirit, the American Law Institute has adopted its own
conflicts of interest policy. See AM. LAW INST., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST POLICY §§ II, IV (adopted
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Writing in this very law review forty-eight years ago, Justice William
0. Douglas had the foresight to call on law review editors to do what
they still sorely need to do now:
I do not propose a law. Rather I propose an editorial policy that
puts in footnote number one the relevant affiliations of the
author. If the article is paid for, I would not necessarily require
the disclosure of the amount of the fee; the fact that there was a
fee would be sufficient. If there were no fee but a client's
interest was reflected in the article, I would want disclosure of
that client's identity. If the author [were] a free-lancer in a
particular field, I would want a general statement that his
professional interest lay in the direction of certain types of
litigation.33
Such an editorial policy, he added, "would put the law reviews on a
high, respected plane, and would give them new prestige and
vigor .... "3 It is an admirable goal. Given that, it is quite fitting that the
editors of the Washington Law Review should heed Justice Douglas' call
and adopt, as they now have, their own unique Disclosure Policy.35
Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.ali.org/doc/Contlicts Policy.pdf (last visited Apr. 12,
2013); see also Tamara Piety, "A Necessary Cost of Freedom "? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS,
62 ALA. L. REv. 1, 42, n.203 (2012) (stating that because "in the past there was no well- developed
norm about financial disclosures, law reviews [are] particularly vulnerable to being used" in ways
that distort the ideal of the "marketplace of ideas").
33. Douglas, supra note 1, at 232. Some scholars urge that the American Law Institute still has
work to do in this arena. See generally Elizabeth Laposata, Richard Barnes, & Stanton Glantz,
Tobacco Industry Influence on The American Law Institute 's Restatements of Torts and
Implications for its Conflict ofInterest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012). These authors disclose
that the research for their article was supported by a grant from the National Cancer Institute (listing
the grant number) and mention that the funding agency had no say in the research or its conclusions.
The authors also disclose relevant institutional affiliations. Id. at I nn.d1, al, aal & aaal.
34. Douglas, supra note 1, at 232.
35. Professor Collins helped draft the Washington Law Review's Disclosure Policy, available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/WLR/disclosure.aspx.
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